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Abstract 
The global financial and economic crisis revealed institutional weaknesses and 
structural problems of particular Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries. 
The crisis and slowdown that followed had an impact on their relative 
competitiveness. Financial and economic turbulences of recent years shed new light on 
the scale and scope of interdependences in the world economy. They uncovered 
economic and institutional flaws of the very EMU itself. The paper focuses on EMU 
countries real sector reactions to the financial disturbances. Both comparative static 
and dynamic approaches are used in order to assess the scope and pace of adjustments 
triggered by the global crisis. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess reactions of the 12 economies of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) to the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009. The pace of 
developments triggered by the crisis uncovered structural problems of particular EMU 
countries and thus has had an impact on their relative competitiveness. Furthermore, the crisis 
shed new light on the scale and scope of interdependences in the world economy and unveiled 
economic and institutional flaws of the very EMU itself, as well as the European Union. The 
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paper draws on the methodology of Kowalski and Pietrzykowski [2010] and focuses on the 
EMU countries’ real sector reactions to the financial disturbances. Both comparative static 
and dynamic approaches are used in order to assess the scope and pace of adjustments 
triggered by the global crisis.    
Section 1 is devoted to a brief discussion of the political and economic context of EMU 
creation. Section 2 addresses the major mechanisms of the 2008-2009 crisis and the global 
slowdown that followed. It also covers the ways it was spread into EMU economies. The 
empirical part concerns the period of 2007-2010 and begins with section 3 covering the fiscal 
performance of EMU countries. The next section examines real effective exchange rates’ 
(REERs) reactions to the crisis. Section 5 is devoted to trade developments generated by both 
REERs’ adjustments and the crisis. Section 6 deals with the shifts in industrial production and 
labor markets. Section 7 is devoted to a discussion of the ways the crisis was reflected in such 
comprehensive measures as gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national income (GNI). 
Finally, shifts in composite summary competiveness indices are also discussed. The paper 
then closes with conclusions. 
 
1.  The EMU in the global context 
The acceleration of globalization in the 1980s and 1990s stemmed both from political 
developments as well as from technological progress. In academic and applied economics it 
was supported by the revival of neoclassical economics [Wojtyna 2008; Blanchard 2010; 
Kowalski 2011]. Since the 1980s the practice of international economic relations was strongly 
influenced by the publications of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which, on the one hand 
questioned ideas on the currency and trade policy of that time, and on the other postulated the 
liberalization of the circulation of goods and capital, as well as the shift from fixed to floating 
exchange rates [Rodrik 1996; Lindley and O’Rourke 2007; Wojtyna 2008; Kowalski and 
Pietrzykowski 2010, p. 12; Kowalski 2011]. The process was enhanced by the IMF policy of 
conditionality towards emerging market economies [Kowalik 2002, p. 277] and by the 
growing popularity of the Washington Consensus [Williamson 2004].  
In general, these processes influenced the European economic integration of the 1980s. 
In this period the idea of finalizing the construction of the Internal Market, and the 
strengthening of the institutional and decision-making framework (the Single European Act), 
were seen by third countries both as an inspirational example, as well as a challenge [Dyson 
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and Featherstone 1999; Gilpin 2000; Pelkmans 2006; di Mauro, Findley and O’Rourke 2007; 
Dees and McKibbin 2008].  
At the French initiative the Commission returned to the concept of a monetary union. 
The work of the Delors Committee began in 1988. It was then greatly intensified following 
Eastern-European events and the unique opportunity of German unification. This policy was 
sealed by the Maastricht Treaty, foreseeing the formation of the EMU [Ungerer 1997; De 
Grauwe 2000; Issing et al. 2001; Skrobisz 2005; Kowalski and Pietrzykowski 2010, pp. 12-
13]. The EMU project was intellectually based on the optimum currency area (OCA) concept 
[Mundell 1961; Mundell 2011; Kenen 1969]. Interestingly, conceptual work on the economic 
and institutional EMU foundation was mostly done by politicians and monetary matters were 
tackled by a subcommittee representing central banks.  
The monetary and fiscal criteria stipulated in the Treaty of Maastricht were not a simple 
reflection of the OCA criteria and are not easily justifiable along theory lines [De Grauwe 
2000]. They rather reflected some arbitrariness of political decisions that led to the 
establishment of the monetary union [Kowalski, Kowalski and Wihlborg 2007, p. 60]. EMU 
convergence criteria stemmed both from accrued experience and from a political bargaining 
process that had started as early as 1987, and was concluded during the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) that paved the way to the Maastricht Summit [Dyson and Featherstone 
1999; Arestis et al. 1999; Skrobisz 2005].  
During the time of the IGC, the emphasis on the ex-ante criteria and the lack of ex-
post disciplinary measures was not very much debated. Instead, the arbitrariness of the actual 
levels of the fiscal Maastricht criteria came under criticism right after their draft (see Pasinetti 
1998). Some economists, e.g. Laufer (1997), noted that the Maastricht criteria were tailored 
according to the historical economic performance of Germany. In fact, the fiscal criteria could 
be derived from the formula determining the budget deficit needed to stabilize government 
debt [De Grauwe 2000, p. 134, cif. Bini-Smaghi et al. 1993]1. 
During the time of rather smooth preparations for EMU introduction, Germany 
requested an institutional correction and proposed the ex-post disciplinary measures. The 
correction took the form of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) that was finally added in 
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required combination of these three parameters in order to stabilize the public debt level (here at 60% of GDP – 
at the time it was the average debt-to GDP ratio in the UE) and assuming the growth rate nominal GDP to be 5%.  
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1997. The rationale behind the SGP was that the EMU member countries, without the ex-post 
SGP rules, would have little incentive to stand for the provisions of the Maastricht treaty after 
the successful examination and the official introduction of the common currency. It was 
rightly argued that the successful entrants, in the absence of the SGP, could pursue 
excessively loose fiscal policies and thus exploit the credibility of the common currency area 
as a whole. Finally such a selfish national policy could dent or even destroy the credibility of 
the whole EMU affecting the economies of other prudent EMU members. To prevent this 
‘free riding’ all the member countries had to commit to maintaining budgetary discipline. 
Formally the SGP ‘mark 1’ consisted of three elements [European Commission (EC) 2004]:  
· a political commitment by all parties involved in the  SGP to the full and timely 
implementation of the surveillance process,  
· a regular monitoring of budget deficits done on the basis of stability and convergence 
programs, and a requirement of corrective actions and, if necessary,  
· imposition of sanctions according to the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP).  
Despite the appeal of robustness and impartiality, the influence of the SGP on short-
term fiscal policies in practice was mitigated by political considerations. The Commission had 
merely been given a monitoring and initiatory role if a member country did not comply with 
the Maastricht provisions [EC 2004]. The actual sanctions’ enforcement decisions were to be  
taken by the Council. In consequence, the members of the Council were effectively judges in 
their own case. As time showed, for a certain period of time even Germany and France did not 
meet the ex-post criteria. The EMU countries had had little incentive to enforce sanctions 
since they were potential, future violators of the budget deficit rule. The arbitrariness of the 
Maastricht criteria and the very decision making procedure made it easy to justify occasional 
or even prolonged breach of the budget deficit rule in the time of adverse economic 
developments. For these reasons the dissuasive power of the SGP proved to be weaker than 
initially foreseen, as could be observed from the Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
(ECOFIN) rulings on German and French deficits.  
In March 2005 ECOFIN, and finally the European Council, in order not to accept the 
erosion of EU law, decided to soften the SGP [Council Regulation (1055/2005)]. In the SGP 
‘mark 2’, the fiscal thresholds (namely 3% deficit and 60% public debt) had remained 
unchanged. However the EDP procedure had, to a certain degree, been relaxed (e.g. no EDP 
should be launched against a member state with a negative or prolonged period of low 
growth). Moreover, the modified SGP listed relevant factors letting a country off an EDP. 
This decision was welcomed by the French and German governments, but was criticized by 
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the [European Central Bank (ECB) 2005a and 2005b] and the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Interestingly, due to the then weak US dollar, the financial markets did not react negatively to 
the modified SGP.     
Analysis of the Maastricht criteria fulfillment on the ‘examination date’ of  January 1, 
1997 indicates the role played by political considerations in the establishment of   
EMU. Based on the European Commission (1998) synopsis of data, Greece was the only 
country of the group of 12 candidates that could not meet both the fiscal and monetary criteria 
in January 1997. Interestingly, the inflation criterion (the reference value of 2.7%) and the 
long term market interest rate (the reference value of 5.0%) were met by all aspiring 
economies (except Greece). This clearly signaled the scope of nominal convergence achieved. 
The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) criterion proved not to be difficult even for Greece. 
However, Finland and Italy were qualified for the third stage of EMU creation without the full 
two-year membership in the ERM II, staying respectively for 15 and 14 months [Council 
Decision 98/317/ EC of 3 May 1998].  
 On the ‘examination date’ of  January 1, 1997 the budget deficit along with Greece 
(-4.6%) was not met by Spain (-3.2%). The most problematic convergence area proved to be 
the public debt criterion (60% of GDP). It was violated, to a various extent, by 9 out of 12 
aspiring economies (Austria 63.9%, Belgium 123%, Finland 61.3%, Germany 60.9%, Greece 
108.5%, Ireland 65.3%, Italy 119.8%, the Netherlands 70.3%, Portugal 60.3% and Spain 
66.7%). Thus it is seen that the Commission and the Council had used both political rationale 
and the built-in flexibility in the criteria formulation to qualify all applicants, except Greece, 
for the third stage of the EMU2. Both Belgium and Italy were positively judged on their debt 
reducing efforts and could join at the early date, whereas Spain was admitted, despite having 
exceeded the budget deficit and public debt thresholds.  
 
2.  Major mechanisms of the 2008-2009 crisis and its proliferation 
Real sector EMU economies’ reactions that followed the global crisis may be analyzed 
in the aggregate demand (AD) context focused on changes in consumption expenditure, 
investment demand, government expenditure and exports and imports. For the sake of 
simplicity both consumption and investment may be treated as domestic private sector 
demand and net exports as a general indication of the intensity of external links of a particular 
country. The impact of the crisis may also be studied in terms of growth models in order to 
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better understand the transitional slowdown that follows major recessions. Both short term 
real sector reactions and long-term consequences of the crisis influence international 
competitiveness.  
Following section 1 it needs to be stressed that EMU countries, due to the prolonged 
processes of integration have developed substantial institutional and systemic similarity. The 
EMU countries retained their national control only of fiscal policy instruments, restricted 
however by the SGP and other specific EU fiscal rules. The lack of national instruments of 
monetary policy, the regime of irrevocable exchange rates, and the limitations imposed on 
national fiscal policies demonstrate the diminishing impact of the EMU states on the course of 
their domestic economic events [Kowalski 2011].  
 Simultaneously, these economies still differ in terms of human, social and production 
capital, natural resources and micro-level institutional solutions. Consequently due to these 
features and also varying traditions, experiences, corporate cultures, degree of respect for law, 
and law enforcement, EMU countries display diversified environments of business, 
entrepreneurship or the ability to create and absorb innovation [Kowalski and Pietrzykowski 
2010, pp. 12-13]. In the context of economic and monetary union, these aspects of mezzo and 
micro-level efficiency became crucial [Schwab 2010]. Thus, adaptive capability on the level 
of businesses and sectors, their product and process innovation capacity, including cost 
control and even cost reduction have become a necessary condition for maintaining 
competitiveness at the national level [Porter 1990; WEF 2011].  
Porter's approach points to four potential groups of economy competitiveness factors: 
resources, the demand side of a given economy, network of sectors, and the business 
environment. The transformation of these potential factors into an actual set of competitive 
advantages requires beneficial conditions, including adequate micro- and macro-economic 
policy. In the context of the EMU and taking into account Common Trade Policy, the Single 
European Market, as well as Competitiveness Policy, what becomes particularly important are 
economy-specific qualitative aspects and the much-emphasized adaptive ability of businesses 
(Kowalski and Pietrzykowski 2010, pp. 13-14).  
In general, the competitiveness of a given economy may be assessed using econometric 
models of real effective exchange rates [Egert 2004; Marrewijk 2004; Rubaszek and Serwa 
2009] or by applying uniform and composite performance measures. The latter are composed 
on the basis of primary statistical data and subjective measures of perception of the business 
environment quality of selected economies and integration groupings [e.g. WEF 2011].  
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In summary, the ways particular EMU economies reacted to the global financial crisis 
that originated in the USA depended on the following broad groups of factors: 
· macroeconomic conditions, especially fiscal ones, at the onset of the global 
turbulences; 
· size and role of the financial intermediation sector in national economies and its 
scope and scale of international linkages; 
· qualitative aspects of the EMU economies and their adaptive ability at the micro 
and mezzo-levels. 
A more detailed framework of the impact of an external shock may be presented such 
as in Figure 1.  The external shock simultaneously hit both the financial and real sectors. Its 
impact  
 
Figure 1. Analytical framework of an external shock 
Notes: MP – monetary policy; FP – fiscal policy; DC – direct control instruments. 
 
was felt with some diversified time lag (Figure 1). However, due to swift expectation 
formation mechanisms its influence on the European banking sector and stock exchanges was 
very strong. Within the EMU context the monetary policy instruments set at the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) Governing Council level could not reflect different needs of 
particular national economies. Thus, the most adaptive stabilization work had to be performed 
by fiscal policy instruments, supported by some regulatory measures belonging to the direct 
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control instruments category (Figure 1). Thus the scale of discretionary and autonomous 
budgetary reactions was also functionally tied with the broad groups of factors indicated 
above.      
In this paper, focusing attention on real economy performance and following the 
approach by Kowalski and Pietrzykowski 2010, it is assumed in the empirical sections that the 
crisis impact indirectly accumulates in major, performance measures, such as real effective 
exchange rates, export development, labor productivity and finally gross output rates and 
volumes. These general performance measures signal, on the one hand, particular EMU 
economies’ shifts in reaction to the global turbulences and then for the induced EMU-wide 
and domestic shocks, and on the other – for particular companies and sectors – they are 
exogenous constraints, threats and also opportunities. 
 
3.  The crisis background 
Financial sector shocks and crises were occurring in the 20th century in virtually every 
decade. The most recent one, initiated in the USA in 2007, is consequently part of a more 
general tendency. Its root causes are complex. The antecedent causes had been accumulating 
for many years.  
The recent crisis may be differentiated from other 20th century crises by its global 
scale and the fact that, apart from the 1929-1933 one, it constitutes the gravest hindrance in  
world economy functioning and growth. The current crisis is the result of the interplay of:   
- mistakes in economic policy,  
- shifts in global real sphere, as well as  
- technological advancements.  
These three broad groups combined had first led to sectoral disruptions and imbalances, 
including first of all the financial intermediation sector, later on they contaminated  particular 
countries, and finally hit cross-national integration groupings (such as EMU) to cover the 
whole world economy in the end. 
The common feature of major financial sector shocks is that they lead to the necessity 
of public intervention, virtually in all cases consisting of financial institution system 
recapitalization. In the past thirty years, the Scandinavian countries, Japan, East Asian states, 
Eastern and Central Europe and the USA have been the breeding grounds of such 
occurrences. The ultimate aim of various intervention forms has been to restore the stability of 
the sector, as well as the trust in banks and the stock market. An ever controversial side effect 
has been using taxpayers’ money to rescue the endangered financial institutions and indirectly 
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their shareholders. This moral ambiguity, in a non-involved observer’s point of view, has 
always provoked intense emotions and disputes. It has also incurred a significant political 
cost. The sole manner of providing public assistance for the sector has depended on the scale 
of the risk, resource allocation method, i.e. the fact that if a particular system has been based 
on bank intermediation (the ‘European model’) or if the stock market has been its heart (the 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ model). The sector concentration scale, as well as the too big to fail dilemma 
[Wihlborg 2010], have also been of considerable importance. 
Another significant feature of the major financial disruptions and above all the natural 
follow-up to the controversy resulting from the scale of public aid is... searching for the 
guilty. This ritual element is understandable; as in the case of aircraft or construction site 
accidents, the slumps and crises alike are caused by human error; at the end of the day, it is a 
person or a group of people who turn out to have been at fault. The quest for the guilty is 
conducted both in political debates, in mass media, as well as within the corporate and 
academic economics’ realm. Such debates are by definition infested with ideology and 
emotions, comp. the Krugman vs. Lucas debate [the Economist 2009, June 11]. The disputes 
are thus centered around the level of responsibility on the part of the politicians, the president, 
prime minister and Secretary of Treasury included, as well as the presidents of central banks 
and financial supervision authorities, not excluding the responsibility on the part of the 
supervisory boards’ and private financial institutions Board of Directors’ chairmen or the 
shareholders and academic economists. The latter group’s responsibility concerns the 
intellectual background for corporate level decision taking, the choice of directions and the 
selection of macroeconomic policy tools. 
The third universal trait of financial crises has been the attempt to find systemic 
corrective action and regulatory solutions of a preventive nature. In the case of the crisis 
initiated in the USA in mid 2007, the debate and dispute have concerned the possibility of 
introducing global systemic prudential solutions in the banking sector, or the role of the rating 
agencies themselves, and their operational framework. What also remains the main focus of 
the debate is the action to be taken to reduce the scale and intensity of ultra-short and short 
capital flows through the possible introduction of Tobin’s tax.  
While analyzing the final dimension of the financial crisis consequences, it is well 
worth noticing that there exists a specific technological race, between different regulatory and 
prudential institutions on one hand, in some part including also rating agencies, and private 
financial sector institutions on the other.  The latter, often as the reaction to conditions created 
by the central bank or government  administration policies (as will be discussed further), have 
 
 
11 
become the source of financial innovations. Product and process innovations, virtually always 
preceding both the regulations’ introduction and the rating agencies’ capability of conducting 
up-to-date and adequate risk assessment connected with them (I decided to put aside the issue 
of corporate governance as related to modern rating agencies, due to the limited space of the 
monograph). 
 In light of the above mentioned comments, as well as available literature, the 2007-
2009 crisis can be analyzed in terms of both the market economy natural tendencies (i.e. its 
cyclicality) and its inherent origins [Gorynia and Kowalski 2008, 2009; Kowalski 2009; 
Kowalski and Shachmurove 2011; Płowiec 2009; Cline 2010; Shachmurove 2011; Taylor 
2010; Catte et al. 2011]. In the latter, there is already an agreement as to the fact that among 
the major macroeconomic policy causes (see Figure 2) that there had been the American 
policy mix, including the Federal Reserve Board’s (FED) monetary policy, that had preceded 
the crisis, especially in the period of September 2001 to May 2004, as well as the economic 
policy, with the PRCh’s exchange rate policy at the forefront. [Eichengreen and Park 2006; 
Feng Lu 2006; Kowalski 2008; Cline 2010]. 
 
Figure 2. Background mechanism of the crisis 
 
The subsequent American administration  expansionist fiscal policy (expenses connected with 
two Gulf Wars, cost of the American presence in Afghanistan and post-9/11 counter-terrorist 
measures, policy assistance in residential housing, etc.) had led to high budget and current 
account deficits. These processes were accompanied by an overtly expansionist monetary 
policy of FED (Figure 2). Similar monetary conditions had been prevailing in the world 
economy in general [The great... 2005]. As a consequence, a multiannual overliquidity period 
followed in the world economy, the effect of which being a decrease in real interest rates, 
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increase in general rate of debt in both public and private sectors, a majorly speculation--
based increase in raw material and financial asset prices. Given such macroeconomic 
circumstances (Figure 2), the private financial sector reacted by introducing large-scale 
financial innovations and a tendency for financial disintermediation appeared; banks changed 
their proffered asset structure towards a more liquid one. In this way, the financial stage was 
set for the crisis.     
 The lack of inflationary pressure (in terms of Consumer Price Index (CPI) or Producer 
Price Index (PPI)) stemmed from the People’s Republic of China (PRCh) and other 
developing economies joining the global economy. Its apparent manifestation was a regular 
trade surplus of PRCh towards the USA. The PRCh’s status, resulting from maintaining a 
visible undervaluation of reninmbi, was additionally strengthened by granting this country a 
membership in the WTO in 2001. The PRCh’s trade surplus went from 2.9% GDP in 2000 to 
9.3% and 8.3% in 2007 and 2008 respectively. According to WTO data the share of Chinese 
exports in total global exports in 1990 amounted to 1.5%, in 2000 - a year before accession to 
the WTO it was 3.9%, only to reach the level of over 9% in 2008. In 2011, the Chinese year 
of record-high exports, the share reached 10.5%, i.e. it increased seven times in the period 
between 1990-2011. Within that time, the world trade share of all the major market 
economies (Japan, Germany and the USA) decreased by 3.9, 3.7 and 3.0 percentage points 
respectively [WTO database]. 
China, thanks to its macroeconomic policy of being able to take advantage of its 
significant yearly trade surplus, has become the major buyer of American treasury bonds and 
other financial assets, thus contributing immensely to the increase in overliquidity in the 
American money and credit market. China has developed into an economy of two surpluses - 
due to the FDI inflow, it has registered a capital account surplus. The international trade and 
financial flow tendencies, outlined in the shortest possible way, have led to the deepening of 
global disequilibria. Their most spectacular manifestation is 30% of total world foreign-
exchange reserve owned by a single country - PRCh. In 2011, this country, alongside Hong-
Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, was in control of 40% of world foreign-exchange reserve. 
Another consequence of overliquidity is the scale of daily FOREX transactions. In 2010, 
according to BIS data, it reached USD 3 981 bn; that is 6.3% of the global GDP!    
Foreign reserves controlled by the PRCh and other emerging countries are currently 
being readjusted to the developed economy financial system rules. Global financial flows 
have been conducted within a small group of large complex financial institutions (LCFI), and 
as a result of this, LCFI have had overliquidity resources to be used at will. Thus their 
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expansion has not been deposit-based; quite to the contrary, it has been market-based. No 
wonder then that LCFI became one of the major culprits and also a major receiver of public 
aid when the crisis erupted. 
4.  Fiscal performance of EMU countries 
The mechanisms outlined in section 2 have had an immense impact on public finance 
and generally fiscal performance in most industrial countries, including all EMU 
economies. Public finance sector deficit, commonly referred to as budget deficit, as well as 
public debt level, are two convergence criteria that retained their binding effect after the EMU 
had been created  (see section 1). From the perspective of public debate and general economic 
governance assessment, these two variables focus attention also due to the fact that they are 
an accurate reflection of a modern state’s involvement in the economy. In the case of the 
EMU, another sort of this significance is demonstrated. In terms of quantitative economic 
policy the member states have only fiscal policy instruments at their disposal. Discretionary 
application of fiscal policy instruments, however, is limited by specific rules and regulations 
adopted by the EU as well as the SGP requirements (compare section 1). In 2007, the criterion 
of public finance sector deficit was met by as many as 10 out of 12 EMU countries, whereby 
6 out of 10 registered budget surplus (the highest being the share of Finland and Luxembourg, 
5.2% and 3.7% of GDP respectively) (Figure 3). In 2007, only Greece and Portugal  
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Figure 3. General government financial balances as % of GDP in 2007-2012* 
* estimate. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database.  
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exceeded the level of 3%, 6.7% and 3.2% of GDP. The financial and economic crisis of 2008-
2009 affected the general government financial balances (GGFB) of the EMU countries in 
different ways. In the period of 2009-2010, it was at its peak, a situation that became apparent 
as all EMU members registered a deficit, with only Finland and Luxembourg not exceeding 
the 3% level (Figure 3). The gravest GGFB downturn took place in Ireland (32.4%), Greece 
(15.6%), Spain (11.1%), Portugal (10.9%) and France (7.5%) (Figure 3). In the subsequent 
years (2010-2011), all the countries were sorting out their public finance condition, owing not 
only to the consolidation measures applied, but also the improving economic situation (see 
section 7). Greece, however, does not fall into the latter category, having found itself on the 
verge of bankruptcy after the revised data became public and the investors’ reaction came to 
light.   
Closer and objective analysis of the GGFB levels in the period of 2007-2011 allows us 
to identify the fact that financial markets overreacted to the transitional financial problems 
that had hit the weakest parts of the EMU. Part of the induced eurozone crisis was the result 
of an EMU-specific decision-making process, and the fact that the infection spread through 
the most important part of the modern economy – the financial intermediation sector. In view 
of this, the case of Ireland demands attention as it is a country that branded its banking sector 
as the economy flagship. The sector’s expansion, significantly exceeding the economy’s 
actual needs, as well as its involvement in international markets and the gradually increasing 
acceptance of mounting risk, transformed a model EU member as of 2008 into a country 
experiencing the most severe structural problems. Simultaneously, the government’s and 
society’s reactions to crisis and the necessity for sacrifice might be considered a model 
example of the possibility of making relevant adjustments in conditions of lacking national 
monetary and exchange rate instruments. 
Another key issue emphasized in Section 1, and one interconnected with budget 
deficit, was the initial, pre-crisis public deficit to GDP ratio (Figure 4). The ratio was the 
result of previous political class determination and the general quality of economic  
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governance alike. It was what determined fiscal policy freedom of action in light of the crisis, 
and signaled the possible reactions on the part of T-bills and T-bonds markets, including the 
long-term view of the euro exchange rate. According to Eurostat data, in 2007 there were only 
5 EMU countries (Luxembourg - 6.7%, the Republic of Ireland - 25%, Finland – 35.2%, 
Spain - 36.1%, and the Netherlands - 45.3%) that maintained the deficit to GDP ratio on a 
level lower than the required 60%. Other countries demonstrated higher deficit levels, to a 
greater or lesser extent (Austria, with its 60.7%, displayed the lowest deviation, while 
Belgium, Italy and Greece produced the highest ones, i.e. 84.2%, 103.6% and 105.4% 
respectively). As the data in Figure 4 show, in the first crisis-ridden year, all EMU countries, 
except Finland, increased the deficit to GDP ratio in comparison with the level as of 2007. In 
the two years that followed, as a reaction to crisis and as a consequence of the increased  
public finance sector deficits, the countries augmented the levels of their debt. The lowest 
level of debt increase in 2010 as compared to 2007 was the share of Italy, Belgium and 
Austria, which amounted to 114.9%, 115%, 119% for those countries respectively (Figure 4).  
It is well worth mentioning that in the period between 2007 and 2010, Austria was the 
country of the most balanced fiscal and debt management policy. Excluding the very specific 
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case of Luxembourg, the highest public debt increase in the 2007-2010 period was the share 
of Ireland (385%), Spain (166%), the Netherlands and Finland – about 138%, as well as 
Portugal and Greece, stated as 136% and 137% for those countries respectively. It is also 
worth mentioning that the finance market participants did not limit their activity to studying 
public data on deficit and debt. They were continuously evaluating the inflowing information 
on the quality of macroeconomic data made available (the case of Greece) and reducing the 
number of  treasury securities investment involving all the southern EMU countries, the debt 
and recession of which posed a threat to their current credit rating. As more and more data 
attesting to Greek macroeconomic accounting fraud were released, and due to the delayed 
ECOFIN and ECB reactions, a negative sentiment towards most ECU countries’ debt began 
to prevail. As a result, the banking sectors, especially the French and Italian, the most 
involved in the treasury securities of the EMU countries registering highest debt/GDP ratios, 
were hit. It consequently translated into the actual and potential need to offer public aid to the 
contaminated banks (see section 2).  
   
5.  Real effective exchange rate 
Real effective exchange rate (REER) serves as a basic price-based measure of 
international competitiveness [Egert 2004; Marrewijk 2004; Kowalski and Pietrzykowski 
2010]. In the EMU context of irrevocable exchange rates, the ability to maintain both price 
and cost downward flexibility, and thus competitiveness, is of utmost importance. It proved to 
be particularly true when these economies faced the necessity to cope with the global crisis 
along with the economic slowdown that followed.   
The issue of inflation rate convergence is important to the EMU as well because 
member states do not have national discretionary monetary instruments, which constitute 
standard sets of tools aimed at inflation control. Indeed, the problems of potential and real 
inflation rate divergence and the lack of national monetary policy tools have been particularly 
complex [Egert 2002; de Grauwe and Schnable 2005; Egert 2007; de Grauwe 2007; 
Kowalski, Kowalski and Wihlborg 2007]. They had also been at the center of academic 
debates prior to the very formation of the EMU. The main discussion threads had been 
centered around the consequences of accepting countries differing from the core European 
ones in terms of price and cost developments.  
In 1999-2007, Germany and Austria improved their relative competitiveness expressed 
in REERCPI. Surprisingly, Greece achieved relatively good results as far as the starting period 
is concerned (Kowalski and Pietrzykowski, 2010, p. 15). In 2007, in comparison to 1999, in 
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countries such as Finland, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy, the REERCPI  
appreciated sizeable. The most severe slump in competitiveness however, was reported in 
Ireland. So the EMU countries began 2007 with a varying relative competitiveness pattern. In 
order to picture the pace of REERCPI reaction to the crisis better, the level of this exchange 
rate was set at the level of 100 as of January 2007 (Figure 5). 
The data in Figure 5 indicate that in the period researched, a considerable REERCPI 
changeability was marked, within which two relatively significant downward adjustments of 
this competitiveness measure were found (May 2008 – Nov. 2009, as well as the subperiod of 
Feb. 2010 – summer months of 2010). In the former subperiod, it was the Netherlands that 
marked the highest real exchange rate depreciation in comparison with January 2007 (REER 
= 98%), whilst it was Ireland that marked the lowest. In the latter stage of downward real 
exchange rate adjustments (June 2010), the most significant changes were demonstrated in 
Ireland (92.3%), the Netherlands and Germany (ca. 94%). 
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Figure 5. Real effective exchange rate deflated by CPI in EMU countries in 2007-2011 (Jan. 
2007= 100) 
 
Source:  Own calculation based on the ECB data. 
 
In this subperiod, Greece was the only country that, due to a relatively higher inflation level, 
recorded the appreciation of its REERCPI and thus lowered its position in international 
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competitiveness (Figure 5).  The whole period of Jan. 2007-Jan. 2011 saw high relative 
changeability of real effective exchange rates. Comparing the REERs in Jan. 2011 with the 
Jan. 2007 level (Figure 5), the following four economies deteriorated as far as their relative 
price and cost position is concerned (Greece – 104.7%, Belgium 101.8%, and Luxembourg 
and Spain 100.6%). The remaining eight countries were able to reduce their price levels in 
reaction to the financial crisis. In this respect, the best three performers were: Ireland 95.6%, 
Germany 95.9% and the Netherlands 96.6% (see Figure 5). Thus, in the course of four years, 
the gap between the worst and best performers in EMU in terms of price and cost 
competitiveness reached over 9 percentage points, reflecting both structural differences and 
different abilities of the service and manufacturing sectors to react to the demand shock 
caused by the financial crisis. 
Cost competitiveness is well reflected by the real effective exchange rate deflated by nominal 
unit labor costs (ULC). As in the case of the REERCPI, a rise in the REERULC index means a 
loss of competitiveness. In the years of 1999-2008 on average, this measure of 
competitiveness confirmed the highest relative adaptability of German and Austrian 
companies, and ultimately their economies. Other economies displaying a relatively high 
adaptability included France, Finland, and – again surprisingly – Greece. The rest of the EMU  
economies significantly diverged from the German model, with the Irish economy showing 
the highest appreciation of real exchange rates, i.e. deterioration of competitiveness 
[Kowalski and Pietrzykowski 2010, pp. 17-18].  
The trends of REERULC in the first years of EMU did not fully confirm the standard 
predictions of the Balassa-Samuelson model [Kowalski, Kowalski, Wihlborg 2007, pp. 80-
81]. The recent crisis further distorted the picture (Table 1). In 2007-2010, the REERULC of 
particular countries displayed some regularities. Only three economies, namely German, Irish 
and Portuguese, reduced their real effective rates deflated by unit labor  
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Table 1. Unit labor costs in EMU countries. 2006=100 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 AChI* 
Austria 98.53 97.99 100.81 100.90 100.22 
Belgium-Luxemb. 100.17 102.61 104.97 103.87 100.95 
Finland 97.95 101.32 108.25 105.45 101.33 
France 99.40 100.62 102.15 102.28 100.57 
Germany 97.01 96.84 101.39 99.02 99.75 
Greece 100.74 103.83 107.00 105.08 101.25 
Ireland 101.36 107.41 105.49 98.98 99.74 
Italy 99.46 101.92 104.80 104.05 101.00 
The Netherlands 99.76 100.86 104.31 102.20 100.54 
Portugal 98.82 99.81 101.20 99.59 99.90 
Spain 102.07 104.98 103.84 101.56 100.39 
* Average chain index: 1 1/2/31/21/ ...- -- ×××= t tttt iiii  
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat data based on a panel of 36 industrial countries.  
 
(Table 1). In 2010, assuming the 2006 level = 100, other countries recorded a deterioration of 
their relative labor cost competitiveness with Finland, Greece and Italy being the worst 
performers in this respect (Table 1).  
          The use of the average chain index offers more interesting insights regarding year by 
year ULC dynamics in particular countries. Between 2007 and 2010, only three EMU 
economies, i.e. Germany, Ireland and Portugal, observed a ULC decline, on average by 
0.25%, 0.26% and 0.10% a year respectively. The rest of EMU boasted a year-by-year 
increase. Thus, between 2007 and 2010, the worst three performers (with the highest ULC 
average annual rise) were Greece (1.5%), Finland (1.34%) and Italy (1.0%). In the world of 
high competitive pressure, and in the EMU context in particular, this purportedly small 
discrepancy between the best and the worst performers meant a rising cost competitiveness 
gap affecting the production and export results, and thus leading to an accumulation of 
structural imbalances among the EMU economies.  
 
6.  The crisis and trade 
Some interesting results of the global economic crisis might be seen in the EMU 
countries’ exports (Figure 6). The share of goods and services export in GDP is a holistic 
measure of  foreign trade’s significance for the economy. As far as world economies are 
concerned, it demonstrates the level of openness and the ability to compete in world markets. 
From another angle, especially in conditions of disruptions such as a financial crisis, it reveals 
how demand simultaneously affects the goods and services exported, as well as the GDP 
decline. As it is, the measure is a mirror of the EMU countries’ dependency on foreign 
demand.     
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Figure 6. Exports of goods and services as % of GDP, 2007-2010. 2007 level=100 
 
Source: Own estimation based on WTO (exports of goods and services) and World Bank (GDP)  
 
In the base year 2007, the most open economies were: the Benelux, Luxembourg, Belgium 
and the Netherlands, 169%, 110% and 84% of product and service export share in GDP 
respectively. The less open economies were those of Italy, Spain and Greece, 29%, 26% and 
21% respectively. 
Within the EMU countries, the influence of crisis was most visible in 2009, when all 
the countries, apart from Ireland, registered a decline in the export of goods and services as 
the share of GDP, mainly as a result of lowered foreign demand (Figure 6). The biggest 
decline of export share in GDP was registered by Italy, Finland and Greece. The case of 
Ireland (an increase in export share in GDP in the whole period of 2007-2010) stems mainly 
from a sharp decline in GDP and demonstrates the mechanism of a small open economy 
dependency on  foreign demand upon an extensive reduction of domestic absorption and 
finally GDP. 
While comparing the level reached by respective countries in 2010 with the pre-crisis  
2007 (Figure 6), it is easily noticeable that the share of goods and services exports in GDP 
was visibly elevated only in Ireland. A 3-percentge-point growth was registered in the 
Netherlands. The rest of the EMU countries registered a lowered share of goods and services 
exports in GDP in 2010 as compared with 2007. The biggest declines were seen in Greece and 
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Finland (Figure 3). As a result of these shifts, 2010 marked the highest export share in GDP in 
Luxembourg, Ireland and Belgium. The lowest share, pointing to difficulties in the area of 
export competitiveness, was registered in Spain, Italy, France and Greece. 
 
7.  Industrial production and unemployment 
Industrial production nowadays constitutes approximately over one fifth of a modern 
economy’s GDP. Despite a relative decrease of the manufacturing importance as compared 
with the service industry, it is precisely manufacturing that ought to be given credit for the 
production of tradables in the highly-developed EMU economies, thus laying the foundation 
of export competitiveness. Figure 7 shows data on production of total industry shown on a 
monthly basis and comprising the period from January 2007-January 2011. In order to show 
the timing and scope of adjustments triggered in particular EMU countries by the external 
shock, the data is set at 100 in the pre-crisis level in January 2007 (Figure 7).            
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Figure 7. Production of total industry. January 2007 = 100. 
 
Source: own calculation based on OECD database.  
 
In 2007, the production of total industry continued to increase, however in some countries, 
such as Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Luxemburg, its dynamics were stagnant or declining 
(Figure 7). In January 2008, the following three EMU economies’ industrial sectors were hit 
the most: the Irish (99.7%), Portuguese (98.2%), and Luxembourgian (95.8%). The difference 
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between the best performer (the Netherlands 111.1%) and the worst (Luxembourg)3 was 16.5 
percentage points. In the latter part of 2008, most of the EMU countries registered production 
decline, whereby their timing and size differed. In December 2008, only the Netherlands 
recorded growth in industrial production (Figure 7). The same was true for January 2009. The 
gap between the Netherland’s production of total industry level and the worst performer’s one 
(Luxembourg (75.06%)) extended to 26.8 percentage points.  
 In 2010, most EMU economies recorded a gradual increase in industrial production. In 
January that year, as compared with January 2007, the best results were still the share of the 
Netherlands (108.6%). The difference between this country and Portugal (77.8%), the latter  
most affected by the slowdown, amounted to as much as 30.8 percentage points. It gives us 
some information on what yet another year of increasing divergence in the adjustment ability 
of the EMU industrial sectors was like. In January 2011, i.e. after four years, only four EMU 
economies witnessed a production growth: the Netherlands (108.3%), Austria (105.8%), 
Ireland (104.2%) and Germany (100.1%). The rest of the countries were not able to retrieve 
the level as of January 2007 (Figure 7). The most difficult industrial sector situation was 
visible in Portugal (production at the level of 85.6% as compared with the level of January 
2007), Luxembourg (85.9%), Italy (83.5%), Greece (82.6%), and Spain (79.6%). The gap 
between the best and the worst performer amounted to 28.7  percentage points in January. As 
demonstrated in Figure 7, the scale and time arrangement of the EMU countries’ industrial 
sector reaction to the external shock makes us aware of how extensive the recession-related 
phenomena might be. It also sheds light on the varying adjustment capabilities of respective 
economies as well as their structural deficiencies, especially in view of the lack of exchange 
rate adjustment instrument.        
 The size of the external shock that hit the EMU had its diversified impact on the 
unemployment rate in particular economies (Figure 8). In 2007, the following countries had 
the lowest unemployment rates: the Netherlands (3.6%), Luxemburg (4.1%) and Austria 
(4.5%). The highest were recorded in: Greece (8.4%), Portugal (8.5%) and Germany (8.7%). 
The pre-crisis year of 2007 was, in most EMU economies, preceded by a declining trend of 
unemployment. This was reflected in the unemployment rates recorded in the EMU in 2008 
(Figure 8). With the exception of Ireland, Italy, Spain and Luxemburg, other countries 
continued their downward tendency regarding the unemployment rate.      
                                                 
 
3 The Luxembourgian industrial sector is dominated by the steel industry, which was particularly vulnerable in 
the recent financial and economic crisis.      
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Figure 8.  Unemployment rate in EMU countries as % of labor force 
 
Source: Labor market statistics: Labor force statistics by sex and age: indicators, OECD Employment and Labor 
Market Statistics (database) 
 
Starting with 2008, the unemployment rate in most EMU countries increased substantially 
(Figure 8). An especially high increase rate was marked by Spain (an increase of 8.8 
percentage points as compared with a record-high level of 20.2% in 2010), Ireland (an 
increase of 8.1 percentage points) and Greece (an increase by 4.9 percentage points).  
The most favorable job market situation in 2010 was observed in Luxembourg, Austria and 
Germany (Figure 8). In the latter county, the unemployment rate as of 2010 was 7.2% and in 
comparison with 2007, it was lower by 1.5 percentage points. As the data demonstrated in 
Figure 8 reveal, the macroeconomic performance measure reflects also the varying adjustment 
capabilities of the EMU economies. Despite remarkably higher labor costs in core European 
countries, their high productivity and quality of products, let them to maintain, and in some 
cases, even increase their competitiveness. A relatively balanced labor market reaction in 
countries such as Germany, Austria or the Netherlands not only attests to their competitive 
capability. One of the key factors of such an unexaggerated labor market reaction is the 
shortage of workforce resulting from demographic trends and the European welfare state 
mechanisms, among others.  
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8.  GDP and other performance measures 
GDP per capita according to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) (Figure 9) is one of the 
most commonly utilized synthetic measures of economic performance. A variation of this 
measure, used in the paper, i.e. PPP, at constant 2005 international dollars (Int.$), taking into 
account the varying price levels still existing in respective EMU countries, allows us to fully 
grasp the real GDP volume and price level differences triggered by the global financial crisis. 
According to [WDI Database], in the pre-crisis year of 2007, the top three in the EMU 
were: Luxembourg (74,144 Int.$), Ireland (41,025 Int.$) and the Netherlands (37,577 Int.$). 
The least wealthy were the following countries: Spain (28,522 Int.$), Greece (26,733 Int.$) as 
well as Portugal (21,993 Int.$). Consequently, the difference between the wealthiest, 
Luxembourg and the least wealthy, Portugal amounted to 3.4x. in 2007. 
 As the data presented in Figure 9 indicate, in 2008, Ireland and Italy, and to a lesser 
degree France, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, were the countries to register the first 
negative effects of the global financial crisis. 2009 witnessed the highest real GDP per capita 
adjustment concerning all the countries with the exception of Ireland, Greece and Spain, 
which also demonstrated a continuous decline of this performance measure in 2010. 
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Figure 9. GDP per capita, at PPP (constant 2005 Int.$). 2007=100 
Source: WDI. 
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In order to compare the GDP level as of 2010 to the one of the pre-crisis 2007 [WDI 
database], it is well worth noticing that the top three remained unchanged, the only difference 
being that Ireland dropped to third position (behind Luxembourg and the Netherlands). Due to 
the crisis and the decline in real GDP, Italy dropped to tenth position, remaining ahead of 
Greece (11) and Portugal (12) only.  
 In the analyzed period of 2007-2010, the base difference in real GDP per capita 
between Luxembourg and the least wealthy, Portugal did not change much and amounted to 
3.3x. Data analysis (Figure 9) allows us to remark that in 2010, as compared with 2007, the 
base GDP per capita level remained unchanged in Germany. A relatively good level was also 
visible in Austria and Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands. The most acute results of the 
crisis, demonstrated by GDP per capita at PPP, were the share of Ireland, as its GDP in 2010 
amounted to slightly over 86% of the 2007 level, Italy and Greece (approx. 93%). 
Figure 10 shows comparative data on Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. This 
measure is a combination of general economic efficiency, differences in inflation rates in 
particular countries, and variations in the number of citizens, as well as employment rates. 
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Figure 10. GNI per capita. (2007=100) 
Source:  Own calculation based on WDI Database. 
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According to WDI data, the highest GNI per capita in 2007 was recorded by Luxembourg (78 
4700 USD). Ireland ranked second (48 590 USD), followed by the Netherlands with a GNI 
per capita of 46 310 USD. Consecutive positions were occupied by Finland (44 160 USD), 
Austria (42 180 USD), and Belgium (41 350). Thus, in the pre-crisis 2007, six countries 
recorded a GNI  exceeding 40 000  USD per capita. In 2007 Ireland (which came second) had 
a GNI 2.44 times higher than Portugal (rank 12). 
In order to compare the relative variations throughout the recent years of EMU, similar 
to the performance measures selected earlier, GNI in particular years is expressed as the 
percentage of the 2007 level (Figure 10). According to data shown in Figure 10, an increase 
of GNI over 9% between 2007-2010 was recorded by four economies: Austria (10.74%), 
Belgium and Germany (9.84%), and surprisingly Portugal (9.74%). The lowest increases were 
recorded in 2010 (compared to 2007) by the following economies: Finland (6.82%), Italy 
(4.43%), and Luxemburg (1.33%). Ireland’s GNI per capita contracted and its 2010 level was 
only 84.36% of that of 2007 (Figure 10).  
Despite the clearly varied GNI growth rate between 2007-2010, the shifts in wealth 
measured in GNI per capita, except Ireland, were minor. This stemmed from relatively large 
differences in the initial levels of GNI per capita in 2007. Due to the huge Irish cost of 
rescuing its banking sector and the recession that followed, this economy lost its high rank 
position; drop from number 2 in 2007 to 8th position. Therefore, the order of the top three 
countries (Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland) changed in 2010. The bottom three 
(Spain, Greece and the last Portugal) did not change. Due to the Irish recession, the following 
countries improved their relative ranks by one notch: the Netherlands moved to 2, Finland to 
3, Austria to 4, Belgium to 5, Germany to 6, France to 7. Five economies maintained their 
pre-crisis relative ranks (Luxemburg as number one, Italy as 9th, Spain as 10th, Greece as 11th 
and Portugal as the 12th). An important characteristic of the crisis years was the continuation 
of convergence of GNI per capita in the EMU.  
Closer examination of competitiveness positions of EMU economies in the Global 
Competitiveness Reports (GCR) may shed some more summarizing light on their relative 
shifts triggered by the global crisis. During the years 2007-2011, the top three EMU 
performers in the GCR were the same, namely: Finland, Germany and the Netherlands (Table 
2). In 2007-2011 Finland was three times the most competitive EMU economy, while 
Germany twice. These three countries also belonged to the top 10 the most competitive 
economies in the world in 2007-2011. In the same period the bottom four economies were 
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also the same, namely: Spain, Portugal, and Italy with Greece being steadily the worst 
performer in the GCR.  
Table 2. Relative positions of EMU countries according to the GCR in 2006-2011* 
2006 2007 2008 (2008-2009) 2009 (2009-2010) 2010 (2010-2011) 2011 (2011-2012) 
Finland (6) Germany (5) Finland (6) Finland (6) Germany (5) Finland (4) 
Germany (7) Finland (6) Germany (7) Germany (7) Finland (7) Germany (6) 
The Netherlands (11) The Netherlands  (10)  The Netherlands (8) The Netherlands (10) The Netherlands (8) The Netherlands (7) 
France (15) Austria (15) Austria (14) France (16) France (15) Belgium (15) 
Austria (18) France (18) France (16) Austria (17) Austria (18) France (18) 
Ireland (22) Belgium (20) Belgium (19) Belgium (18) Belgium (19) Austria (19) 
Belgium (24) Ireland (22) Ireland (22) Luxemburg (21) Luxemburg (20) Luxemburg (23) 
Luxembourg (25) Luxembourg (25) Luxemburg (25) Ireland (25) Ireland (29) Ireland (29) 
Spain (29) Spain (29) Spain (29) Spain (33) Spain (42) Spain (36) 
Portugal (43) Portugal (43) Portugal (43) Portugal (43) Portugal (46) Italy (43) 
Italy (47) Italy (46) Italy (49) Italy (48) Italy (48) Portugal (45) 
Greece (61) Greece (65) Greece (67) Greece (71) Greece (83) Greece (90) 
*Note: Numbers in parentheses reflect countries’ total GCR ranks. 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on Global Competitiveness Reports. 
 
As shown in Table 2 Ireland, so far, in terms of GDP and GNI per capita, the most hit 
economy in CGR rankings lost 7 notches (from 22 to 29), but within the EMU ranks it went 
down only from 7th to the 8th position. The most punished EMU economy was however 
Greece: its GCR position deteriorated from 65th in 2007 to 90th in 2011. The crisis showed 
strong discrepancies between the best Northern EMU members and the Southern flank. The 
distance between the average CGR positions of the top three and the average position of the 
bottom four economies increased from 39 notches (2007), 40 and 41 notches in 2008 and 
2009 respectively to as many as 48 in 2010 and 2011 (Table 2).  
Competitiveness ratings such as GCR might be criticized for their subjectivity and 
simplification. However, the assessments offered by GCR, are consistent with the general 
picture of the reaction of EMU countries to the crisis that emerges in this paper.  
 
Conclusions 
The global crisis began in 2007 in the USA and fully developed worldwide in 2008-
2009. It sent shockwaves to Europe and thus hit EMU countries as well. Its main propagation 
pathways were capital and trade flows and expectation channel. The EU and EMU countries 
found themselves in recession. The crisis, although technically called off in 2009, was 
followed by slow growth and increased uncertainty. It unveiled both fiscal vulnerabilities and 
structural rigidities in most developed countries.  
Global crisis repercussions were particularly difficult for EMU economies. In this 
relatively new institutional framework of independent states with a single currency and 
uniform monetary policy defined at a supranational level by the ESBC/EBC, deficiencies in 
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decision making proved to aggravate the negative shock felt by national economies. The ECB 
2008 speedy anti-crisis actions were well received by financial markets. However, the pace of 
events, and in particular the case of Greece showed, that EMU economic governance was not 
adequately prepared to handle the global-crisis-induced challenges for individual countries. 
The crisis also proved that in the EMU context individual economies’ threats soon became  
Pan-European problems.   
In this paper, with the use of simple performance measures of international 
competitiveness of EMU states it was confirmed that these economies differ in terms of price 
and cost flexibility and have different actual ability to react to the external shocks. The best 
overall results were recorded by Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Austria. These 
Northern countries did much better in 2007-2010 than the rest of the EMU. EMU countries 
from Southern Europe, due to their structural barriers and hysteresis of cost and price 
behavior had suffered the most. With this general background the case of Ireland calls for 
special attention. As was the case with other Convergence Four countries it suffered from 
overheating in the real estate sector. But the main factors behind its painful recession were 
economic and fiscal repercussions of the overexpansion of the Irish banking sector. The actual 
fiscal costs of the implementation of the too-big-to-fail rule sent its budget deficit in 2010 to 
an unprecedented level of over 32 per cent of GDP and forced the government to implement 
harsh expenditure cuts and rescue plans designed to overhaul the banking sector. This case 
along with the cases of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy show that the main roots of the crisis 
development and causation scheme have had their origins in national economies and national 
policy mistakes. The domestic economy problems were further magnified by globalization 
forces. They in turn threatened the historical construction of the very European welfare state.  
The European welfare state developed step by step after WWII and lead to an upward 
secular trend in general government expenditure and consequently needed high taxation. Its 
social security dimension, in most countries, had been reflected in job protection regulations 
leading towards labor market rigidities. These features of the contemporary welfare state were 
particularly dangerous for the less innovative and less productive economies of Southern 
Europe that became the EU and consequently EMU members.  
 These objective tendencies were enhanced by the crisis itself and the economic and 
institutional features of Economic and Monetary Union. The Southern EMU economies that 
were accepted on political grounds proved their limited downward cost flexibility in reaction 
to the crisis. It had automatic negative impact on general government financial position. In 
some countries, Greece being a particularly bad example, governments tried to stabilize their 
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national economies by using debt-financed aggregate demand policies. The combination of 
cyclical budget deficits and discretional expansionary fiscal policies led to growing deficits 
and further accumulation of public debt.  
Strained government finances had a negative impact on financial markets’ perception of 
current and future macroeconomic stability. Bounded public finance and the specific single 
European market context reduced national fiscal policy efficiency. The growing sovereign 
default risk raised funding costs in both public and private sectors, even in the loose monetary 
policy framework. This in turn fueled negative expectations regarding sustainability of 
macroeconomic stability and further increased the default risk not only at the government debt 
level but also in the financial and real sector domains. In order to break this vicious circle the 
current fiscal consolidation in EMU countries should be accompanied by transitory ECB’s 
more active and unconventional policy. The policy mix, together with the fiscal consolidation 
would require more coordination of national fiscal policies at the EMU level. In the longer 
term perspective the EMU requires bold decisions regarding the scope and shape of common 
fiscal policy, including its stabilization function. This means that the Fiscal Pact discussed in 
2011 and approved by 25 EU member states in January 2012 failed to address the common 
fiscal policy dimension. Apparently it proved to be politically unfeasible at the moment.  
The overhaul of EMU decision making and fiscal coordination will be insufficient if it is 
not accompanied by national effective efforts to increase innovation readiness and cost 
flexibility at the micro level. The recent crisis showed how important these micro-level 
features are. Furthermore, the stiff global competitive pressure requires reforms of the 
European welfare state model. Its fiscal costs have become not only a burden in the context of 
the required fiscal consolidation, but are becoming unsustainable. They endanger the very  
economic foundation of the European welfare state.  
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